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Our theoretical and practical understanding of cognitive development depends on working 
memory, the limited information temporarily accessible for such daily activities as language 
processing and problem-solving. Here I assess many possible reasons why working memory 
performance improves with development. A first glance at the literature leads to the weird 
impression that working memory capacity reaches adult-like levels during infancy but then 
regresses during childhood. In place of that unlikely surmise, I consider how infant studies may 
lead to overestimates of capacity if one neglects supports that the tasks provide, compared to 
adult-like tasks. Further development of working memory during the school years is also 
considered. Various confounding factors have led many investigators to suspect that working 
memory capacity may be constant after infancy; the factors include developmental increases in 
knowledge, filtering out of irrelevant distractions, encoding and rehearsal strategies, and pattern 
formation. With each of these factors controlled, though, working memory still improves during 
the school years. Suggestions are made for research to bridge the gap between infant and child 
developmental research, to understand the focus and control of attention in working memory and 
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Working Memory Maturation: Can We Get At the Essence of Cognitive Growth?  
 
Few topics are more difficult to study than the development of fundamental processes in 
cognition. As the infant becomes a child and the child approaches adulthood, more facts are 
learned and more concepts are understood.  More problems can be solved and more types of new 
learning become possible. More situations are coped with, and more strategies for coping with 
them are tried out and practiced.  How is one supposed to zoom in to see what the contribution of 
a single factor to development may be, when so many entangled factors improve concurrently? 
Occasionally it is possible to find, say, a situation in which maturation occurs in the absence of 
further practice of a certain skill (e.g., Cowan & Leavitt, 1987), but that type of situation usually 
seems unavailable to help separate out the basic factors of development. Therefore, extra care 
and effort are needed to try to understand cognitive growth, and in the present review I carefully 
attempt to understand the development of one key cognitive mechanism, working memory. The 
difficulties in doing so include (1) apparent contradictions between the results of procedures used 
with infants versus children and adults, and (2) a host of potential confounding factors. 
The Issue of Working Memory Development 
Researchers of human development seem to agree on the importance of parameters of 
information processing, including working memory, the control of attention, inhibition of 
prepotent schemes, and self-regulation, in the developmental maturation of cognition.  It seems 
clear within this general framework that a special role in cognitive development is played by 
working memory, the small amount of information that is currently highly accessible and 
available for cognitive processing.  It includes the information in the conscious mind or available 
to it, and therefore refers to something quite central in cognition (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
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Cowan, 1988; Miyake & Shah, 1999).  Many aspects of cognition vary depending on the 
working memory abilities of the child, and are compromised in children with various learning or 
processing challenges that can affect language comprehension and production, reading, 
mathematics, and problem-solving (e.g., Cowan, Elliott et al., 2005; Cowan, 2014; Cowan & 
Alloway, 2009; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1990; Jarrold & Bayliss, 2007; Maehler & Schuchardt, 
2009; Siegel & Linder, 1984; Siegel & Ryan, 1989; Swanson & Sachse-Lee, 2001). Working 
memory allows the retention of data needed to complete tasks, such as the retention of the early 
part of a sentence while putting the whole thing together or, in math, a digit to be carried to the 
next column mentally. Working memory also allows characteristics of a new situation to be 
considered so that an effective response can be programmed up; in that respect, working memory 
is key for fluid intelligence (e.g., Geary, 2004). The time seems right for an evaluation of recent 
evidence on why working memory develops. In this article, I will describe evidence against the 
adequacy of various common hypotheses, and suggest new ways to understand the literature. 
Knowing why working memory performance improves would not only explain the basic 
finding of spans that increase with age across all tested types of working memory task (e.g., 
Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004); it would also help in various analyses of 
real-life cognitive tasks.  Until we understand why working memory improves, we will not 
understand limits on how many operations can be carried out while the necessary data are held in 
mind (Case, 1995; McLaughlin, 1963; Pascual-Leone, 1970) or how many items can be 
interconnected to form a new concept (Halford, Cowan, & Andrews, 2007). These questions 
stem from a neo-Piagetian viewpoint, in which the maturation of fundamental information 
processing parameters determines the capabilities and limits of cognition (Case, 1985; 
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Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards, & Krause, 1998; Demetriou, Christou, Spanoudis, & 
Platsidou, 2002; Fischer, 1980; Halford, 1993; Pascual-Leone, 1970).  
The expansion of working memory capacity can predict the development of cognitive 
aptitude (Andrews, Halford, Murphy, & Knox, 2009; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2011).  One 
basis is that associations can be formed among items in working memory concurrently, up to a 
capacity limit of several elements, either deliberately (Halford, Baker, McCredden, & Bain, 
2005) or incidentally (Cowan, Donnell, & Saults, 2013). As a simple, concrete example of the 
potential importance of working memory capacity for a young child’s conceptual understanding, 
consider the folk definition of a tiger as a big cat with stripes. When forming the concept, if one 
forgets the large size, a common house cat could fit the bill.  If one forgets instead that this 
animal must be a cat, it could be a zebra; and if one forgets instead the stripes, it could be a lion.  
The correct understanding of the concept thus involves concurrent consideration of at least three 
properties (large size, classification as a kind of cat, and the presence of stripes). It was on the 
basis of examples much like this that McLaughlin (1963) suggested an alternative to Piaget’s 
stages of development, based on developmental increases in immediate memory, which would 
allow concepts of increasing complexity to be kept in mind and thus to be comprehended.   
The present review is related in spirit to an earlier review that Dempster (1981) carried out 
on the development of memory span, the length of list that can be repeated without error. It was a 
review so penetrating that I found it informative when returning to it while completing the 
present effort. (In turn, Dempster owes a debt to Blankenship, 1938.)  Dempster considered 10 
potential sources of variation in the form of structures and strategies that might account for 
developmental and individual differences. For most of the potential sources of variation, it was 
concluded that there was not yet enough information; the one exception was the speed of item 
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identification, said to be a source of change. The present review differs from Dempster not only 
in its reference to the subsequent 34 years of research, but also in orientation, in 5 ways.  First, 
the present review is not limited to span or any one procedure, but roams across many 
procedures to gain insight into developmental change in the number of items that can be held in 
working memory. Second, whereas Dempster considered the serial order of responses, the 
present review focuses on the retention of items, generally without regard to their order. Third, 
whereas Dempster confined his review to children old enough to carry out a span task, the 
present review covers and attempts to reconcile two periods during which the most evidence has 
been accumulating in recent years:  infancy, and the school years.  Fourth, whereas Dempster 
was pessimistic about the notion of capacity or number of items kept accessible concurrently as a 
simple, potential mechanism of development, here that mechanism is revived and updated.  Fifth, 
and finally, there is less concern here about which processes play some role in performance, and 
more of an assumption that many such processes probably do so.  Instead, there is a more 
focused theoretical aim, to determine whether we need the notion of developmental change in 
basic capacity, or whether sources of variation such as knowledge and processing strategies can 
explain development even with capacity constant from infancy onward.  That has been the 
question underlying much of my own developmental research published in the past 15 years. 
Outline of the Review 
In what follows, I start with a discussion of the history of research on the notion of 
working memory capacity and its development. Here I am talking about a construct that is more 
abstract and principled than just the level of performance on working-memory tasks.  Second, 
capacity during infancy is examined, and is contrasted with child developmental findings.  There 
are discrepancies between them in which infants look more capable than children, a paradox that 
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can be resolved either by reinterpreting the infant research or by noting task demands in the child 
research that do not apply to the infant research.  Third, reasons for the developmental 
progression during the school years are further examined, with various confounding factors 
controlled.  Fourth, and finally, in the concluding remarks, a few additional suggestions are made 
for further research to clarify the nature of working memory capacity development.  
Theoretical and Empirical Background  
A Brief History of Working Memory Capacity 
Definitions and origins.  The term working memory was perhaps first used in psychology 
by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) to describe the organized collection of data and 
procedures that one must retain in order to plan and carry out actions. (The term was also used in 
computer science by Newell & Simon, 1956).  A bit later, the term working memory was used to 
describe a multi-component system in the human mind and brain that retains limited information 
temporarily while processing it (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  It is in that sense that working 
memory is explicitly supposed to have a limited capacity.   
The term working memory is used in many different “flavors” by different investigators, as 
I learned when Miyake and Shah (1999) asked every contributor of their volume to define 
working memory.  Some use the definition to describe the mechanisms involved. Thus, Baddeley 
(1986) included in the definition not only passive information-holding stores, but also central 
executive processes said to manipulate information in these stores (attention-shifting, updating of 
memory, inhibition of irrelevant information, etc.). According to that definition, short-term 
memory is just an outdated term that does not make distinctions between the parts. That 
nomenclature persists for many investigators.  Perhaps the central executive processes were 
included within the definition of working memory because Baddeley and Hitch originally 
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attributed memory storage capability to them, though that was no longer the case for Baddeley 
(1986). Some, such as Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, and Conway (1999), have been most interested 
in the central executive or attention-based component and have tended to call it, alone, working 
memory, using the term short-term memory for the passive storage of information.   
I use the term working memory in a rather theory-neutral sense, including as working 
memory any mechanism that helps hold information in a temporarily accessible state and 
provides a basis for ongoing cognitive processing, but excluding the processing itself from the 
definition. Others may then agree with the definition while disagreeing on the mechanism. In 
terms of the mechanism, I point to a focus of attention that can expand in scope to apprehend 
several items or chunks at once, or narrow down to concentrate on just one chunk, and activated 
elements of long-term memory (e.g., Cowan, Saults, & Blume, 2014).  Neurally and behaviorally 
the scope of attention, highly dependent on parietal areas of the brain, is said to be separate from 
the control of attention or central executive processes, highly dependent on frontal areas, with 
activated memory in various association areas (Cowan, 2011). Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, 
Jarrold, and Greaves (2012, p. 779) similarly characterize working memory as “as a system for 
holding a limited amount of information available for processing,” even though their model of 
working memory is based entirely on interference processes, unlike Cowan et al. (2014). We 
included those processes but maintained that a multi-item attention focus also is involved.  
Empirical work on something like a limited working memory, albeit without reference to 
that particular term, goes back much further, to the beginning of the field of experimental 
psychology. It played an important role in the work of Wilhelm Wundt, who established the first 
experimental psychology laboratory around 1876 in Leipzig, Germany (Fancher, 1979) and 
helped inspire James (1890) to describe primary memory, the trailing edge of the conscious 
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present.  Around the same time, Ebbinghaus (1885/1913) carried out what has been considered 
the first research on memory, extensively on himself, trying to memorize lists of nonsense 
syllables and filing them away to test his memory later.  The shortest list tried, 7 syllables long, 
was recalled correctly after the first repetition of the list, whereas the next-largest list, 12 
syllables long, took on average over 16 repetitions. The 7-syllable list thus illustrated what 
Ebbinghaus (p. 33) called “first fleeting grasp” of a list, essentially immediate or working 
memory.  Related investigations that were focused on immediate memory followed, including 
the rapid apprehension of several objects (Jevons, 1871) as well as memory span and its 
improvement with child development (Bolton, 1892; Jacobs, 1887).   
Chunks as the units of working memory.  Miller (1956) famously discussed the fact that 
there is a basic limitation in the capability of working memory, to about 7 items. This limitation 
was in stark contrast to the information-theoretic framework, which was popular at the time that 
he wrote because of its relevance for computers. The amount of memory in a computer is 
characterized in information theory by the number of binary choices that can be preserved, each 
memory location being switched on or off; human brains also make binary choices, when each 
nerve cell either does or does not fire in a given instant (McCullough & Pitts, 1943). Working 
memory, though, does not work on a binary basis. English-speaking adults know 10 digits (i.e., 
slightly more than 23 digits, or 3 binary choices) as opposed to well over 10,000 common words 
(~214, i.e., 14 binary choices), a difference of 3 orders of magnitude. Yet, Miller showed that the 
spans for lists of random digits or for lists of English words are both about 7 items.  The items 
that count in working memory capacity appear to be familiar items or chunks; so for example, if 
one knows the acronyms for U.S. agencies IRS, CIA, and FBI, then the 9 letters contained in 
these acronyms can be remembered easily, in order, as a sequence of 3 acronymic chunks. The 
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process of forming and using chunks does not depend on language, given that it has been shown 
to occur even in preverbal infants (Feigenson & Halberda, 2008).    
Under some circumstances, presumably when covert recitation can assist recall, capacity is 
affected by how long it takes to say each chunk (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975; Towse 
et al., 2005; Zhang & Simon, 1985).  However, a chunk capacity limit can be obtained rather 
cleanly by curtailing articulatory processing, in which case adults can retain typically only 3 or 4 
chunks (Chen & Cowan, 2009; Cowan, 2001; Cowan, Rouder, Blume, & Saults, 2012).   
There is a further current debate about working memory units that is beyond the scope of 
the present work, as its development has not been pursued sufficiently (though see Cottini et al., 
2015; Riggs, Simpson, & Potts, 2011). Specifically, there is a theoretical possibility that items 
are not simply present or absent from working memory, but present only to a degree, either 
because some of the features of the item have not been retained (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; 
Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Hardman & Cowan, 2015) or because the memory of some 
continuous property, such as the angle of a line, is retained only imprecisely (Ma, Husain, & 
Bays, 2014; Zhang & Luck, 2008, 2011). This debate can be circumvented by talking about how 
many items can be remembered with sufficient precision to choose among alternatives, and 
memory for alternatives does seem limited to about 3 or 4 chunks in adults. A complex item like 
a Chinese character or colored shape may require multiple chunks. There could be 
developmental growth of precision:  with development, representations could become more 
complete or precise, or the number of memory slots needed to encode a particular complex 
object could decrease. These possibilities will not be addressed directly here but they do figure 
into the developmental work that will be reviewed (cf. Kibbe, in press).    
Development of Working Memory Capacity? 
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A simple and often-suggested basis of working memory development is an increase in the 
capacity of a holding mechanism that retains items in working memory, most notably the focus 
of attention (Cowan, 1988).  In its simplest form, this working memory capacity growth could be 
expressed in the number of slots that can hold discrete items. However, the developmental logic 
is similar if maturation is thought of in terms of a fluid resource (e.g., energy) that can be 
distributed among items in such a way that, typically, only a limited number of items can be 
retrieved with enough precision to allow recall or recognition of categorically different items, 
and that number increases with age.  I shall present an empirical base and then explore the 
theoretical ramifications of this idea.   
Documenting working memory development.  Many studies show increases in 
performance on short-term or working memory tests across ages in childhood.  In this section we 
consider the simple hypothesis that with maturation, the number of separate chunks that can be 
held in working memory concurrently increases.  Let us first document the developmental 
pattern, before trying to analyze what it may mean. The most extensive data set I know in which 
many types of test were administered across a wide age range using standard methods is from 
Gathercole et al. (2004).  In Figure 1, I have rescored the means from their Table 1 to provide 
estimates of the number of items recalled, as described in the figure caption.  Clearly, there is a 
steady improvement in performance from 4-15 years.  Given that 15-year-olds approach adult 
levels of performance in other studies, this figure describes well the latter portion of the child 
developmental trajectory.  Most of the measures are simple span measures requiring only 
reproduction of verbal or nonverbal stimuli, whereas three of the measures require processing 
also:  reversal of the presented order (backward span), judging the veracity of sentences while 
remembering the last word of each (listening span), or counting dots within arrays while 
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remembering the dot tallies (counting span). The developmental trend is similar across tests, 
except in two cases (visual pattern span and mazes), in which developing grouping processes 
may steepen the age trend as older children recode items to form a spatial configuration,.   
Development of the number or size of chunks?  The number of items presented to the 
participant and then recalled need not equal the number of separate slots in working memory. A 
complex item might be converted to more than one chunk, whereas multiple, potentially related 
items might be combined into a single chunk. Therefore, the meaning of developmental increases 
in working memory performance can be known only if the units are known. At least two classic 
attempts were made to address this issue, but the results were discrepant.  Dempster (1978) 
created word series with low word-to-word association values to limit chunking.  Whereas digits 
yielded a 24% increase in span during the elementary school years, the specially-constructed 
word set yielded only a 5% increase, suggesting that most of the developmental change came 
from improvements in chunking efficiency. In contrast, though, Burtis (1982) varied the 
opportunity for chunking by using letter pairs that were easy to chunk (e.g., MM), hard to chunk 
(e.g., FB), or intermediate (e.g., FM, as in a type of radio).  The chunking manipulation was 
successful at all ages but nevertheless did not diminish age differences in performance.  The 
discrepancies between these classic results point to the need for further study.     
In a more recent research approach, the stimuli have lent themselves neither to rehearsal 
nor to chunking, because they were presented quickly, often in a simultaneous array.  Estimates 
of working memory capacity from such procedures are typically in the range of 3 or 4 objects in 
adults (Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1998), with smaller estimates in preschoolers and children 
in the early elementary school years, about 2 to 2.5 items (e.g., Cowan, Nugent, Elliott, 
Ponomarev, & Saults, 1999; Cowan, Elliott et al., 2005; Riggs, McTaggart, Simpson, & 
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Freeman, 2006; Simmering, 2012).  However, some infant studies seem to suggest that infants 
retain at least 3 items, similar to adults (e.g., Ross-Sheehy, Oakes, & Luck, 2003; Zosh & 
Feigenson, 2015). These are not trivial discrepancies and they require explanation; they have not 
been reconciled in previous work. Dialogues between infant and child researchers are needed. 
Neo-Piagetian theory.  Piaget discussed the progression of children through various 
logical stages, but there was always a bit of tension within Piagetian thought.  Task complexity 
and the memory requirements of the task clearly influenced performance on conceptual tests, a 
phenomenon called horizontal décalage (Piaget, 1977). Such findings were handled more 
gracefully by neo-Piagetian psychologists, who posited that fundamental information processing 
parameters like memory and processing efficiency improved with maturation. Better information 
processing in turn was said to allow more complex concepts to be comprehended, harder 
problems to be solved, and so on (Burtis, 1982; Case, 1985, 1995; Commons, Trudeau, Stein, 
Richards, & Krause, 1998; Fischer, 1980; Halford, 1993; Halford, Cowan, & Andrews, 2007; 
Demetriou, Christou, Spanoudis, & Platsidou, 2002; Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Pascual-
Leone, 1970).  The processing parameter with perhaps the most impact was working memory, 
the small amount of information that can be readily accessed for completion of a task.  
Even when children varied in their strategies for approaching a problem (e.g., Siegler, 
1994), strategy selection and execution could be thought of as dependent on working memory 
capacity.  The initial employment of a strategy that has promise may at first be cumbersome and 
attention-demanding, given that it is different from what the participant is used to but, with 
practice, the strategy can become less attention-demanding, and thus more helpful to 
performance (a change that has been documented for verbal rehearsal by Guttentag, 1984). The 
neo-Piagetian view would promote the idea that the growth of capacity is involved even in the 
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conceptual, behavioral, and strategic changes that occur during infancy and early childhood, so it 
is of considerable importance to understand the nature of both the early and later child 
development of working memory. 
From Infancy to Childhood:  Growth and Changing Task Demands 
The Working Memory Capacity Growth Hypothesis 
According to neo-Piagetian theories, the number of items that can be held in working 
memory (number of slots) governs how many schemes can be coordinated to produce a concept 
or motivate an action, and the number increases with development (e.g., McLaughlin, 1963; 
Pascual-Leone, 1970). Thus, from the mid-1960s until the mid-1980s, it was often suggested by 
cognitive developmental psychologists that processing and conceptual advances lead to 
performance advances. A child was ready to represent objects or people with words just after the 
child was able to remember that objects remained in existence even when hidden; typically this 
occurred within the first two years of life (Corrigan, 1978; Kahn, 1976; Moore & Meltzoff, 
1978).  The ability to count could be linked to a concept of one-to-one correspondence (e.g., 
Greeno, Riley, & Gelman, 1984). Basic science and mathematics understanding could be linked 
to conceptual advances such as conservation, the notion that, when matter is molded or poured 
into a different shape or cut into pieces, there is still the same amount of matter (e.g., Fischbein, 
1987).  Subsequent infant research, though, challenged neo-Piagetian thought. 
Background of infant perceptual studies.  Piagetian theory no longer dominates 
developmental work, largely because infants have been shown to engage in many types of 
thinking that, according to Piagetian theory, they should not be capable of, beginning with the 
ability to be surprised by a violation of object permanence as early as 5 months of age 
(Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991). Whereas in the original 
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research by Piaget and others, infants had to reach under a cloth to retrieve a hidden object, the 
newer research examined infants’ reactions to an object’s disappearance while it was behind an 
occluder.  Infants, much younger than Piaget would have suspected, also have been shown to 
have some understanding of diverse properties of objects and events (e.g., that two objects 
cannot be in the same place at the same time: Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990; 
Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992).  They show evidence of a mental faculty 
allowing enumeration of small numbers of objects (Wynn, 1996), transitive inferences (Mou, 
Province, & Luo, 2014), and false beliefs (Choi & Luo, 2015).  Moreover, the bulk of research 
itself has largely shifted to the infancy period.  In this research, infants are typically shown to be 
surprised by events that should not take place according to principles of the real world that 
infants previously had been assumed not to know. 
The discrepancy between the quick acquisition of concepts according to the infant research 
and the much slower acquisition of concepts in child research (see Marti & Rodriguez, 2012) led 
Keen (2003) to ask, about the representation of objects and events, “Why do infants look so 
smart and toddlers look so dumb?”  The discussion naturally centered on differences in task 
demands in the infant versus child procedures.  In one phenomenon, a ball essentially rolled 
down behind an opaque screen and should have come to rest when it hit a partition that extended 
up above the screen.  On impossible-event trials, the ball instead showed up on the wrong side of 
the partition. Infants noticed the oddness of the impossible event according to the amount of 
surprise indexed by looking time.  In contrast, in the toddler procedure, in which the child had to 
reach for the ball, evidence of knowledge of the ball’s whereabouts did not emerge in two-year-
olds. Nevertheless, these toddlers did pass the surprise test measured by looking time as in the 
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infant procedure (Hood, Cole-Davies, & Dias, 2003; Mash, Novak, Berthier, & Keen, 2006).  
This research establishes the point that infant-child discrepancies can be linked to task demands. 
Infant working-memory studies. A number of studies with different procedures suggest 
that the capacity of working memory dramatically increases between 6 months of age, when 
infants can respond well on procedures with only a single item to be remembered, and at most 
two months later, when infants can respond well on procedures with several items in a series or 
an array to be remembered (for reviews see Kibbe, in press; Oakes & Luck, 2013; Zosh and 
Feigenson, 2015; Simmering, 2012). Moreover, these infants older than 8 months at some point 
appear to have a capacity of about 3 items, which is an adult-like number if one accepts the 
infant and adult procedures as equivalent.  The 3 items apparently become individuated 
sometime around the end of the first year (Kibbe & Leslie, 2013).  This point needs careful 
scrutiny because children in the early elementary school years, tested with the adult-like 
procedures, seem to remember fewer items.  
In one relevant infant procedure, Ross-Sheehy, Oakes, and Luck (2003) presented series of 
arrays on the left and right sides of the screen.  On one side, successive arrays differed in one 
color, whereas the arrays presented to the other side were all identical. Six-month-old infants 
looked longer at the changing display only with 1-item arrays on each side, but ten-month-olds 
did so with 4-item arrays, comparable to what is found with adults using the adult procedure.  
This result was not obtained in these infants using 5-item arrays.  The correspondence with 
adults’ capacity could be a coincidence, inasmuch as adults appear to have a capacity that 
actually reaches an asymptotic level closer to 3 items (e.g., Cowan, Fristoe, Elliott, Brunner, & 
Saults, 2006; Rouder et al., 2008; Zhang & Luck, 2008); no one suspects that infants have a 
higher capacity than adults. In the infant procedure, perhaps not every change is detected, but 
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still enough of them to attract attention.  In any case, there are a larger number of recently-
activated colors in the changing side of the array, automatically attracting attention.    
The possibility of an overestimate of capacity with a multiple-look procedure was 
eliminated in later work by Oakes, Baumgartner, Barrett, Messenger, and Luck (2013).  On 
every trial, the infant saw an array only once, followed by another array that gave the infant a 
choice of looking at an item that came from the array, versus another item that was new.  For 
arrays with two unique objects, 8-month-old infants looked for more time at the novel item, 
indicating the ability to remember the array, whereas 6-month-old infants could do so only with 
arrays limited to one object.  The 8-month-olds’ proportion of looks to the changed square, it 
should be noted, was not very high: it hovered around .60.   
Kibbe and Leslie (2011) found that when infants of 6 months see two objects disappear 
behind occluders, they are surprised when an occluder is raised and the object is missing, but not 
when the object that appears is the wrong one, the one that had disappeared behind the other 
occluder. The implication is that even 6-month-old children have rudimentary multiple-object 
representations, but not including the details of the individual objects.  The progression of infant 
findings suggests that object-file representations are quite basic but that the details of these 
objects are filled in with maturation in infancy.  In the study of Kibbe and Leslie, infants may 
only have remembered that the occluders had objects behind them.  
The change between 6 months and several months later may have to do with the 
individuation of objects.  Ross-Sheehy, Oakes, and Luck (2011) used a multiple-exposure 
procedure and found that when there was a moving pre-cue (inasmuch as one array item rotated), 
even 5-month-old infants preferred the stream in which the rotating object changed color from 
frame to frame, compared to the stream in which the rotating object remained the same color (as 
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did all of the objects). In contrast, when there was no such salient pre-cue, 6-month-olds 
apparently perceived the array without separating the objects. 
In the aforementioned studies, the looking responses might be considered automatic rather 
than deliberate.  In a procedure suggesting that infants already have acquired the ability to think 
of 3 items in working memory deliberately, Feigenson and colleagues have conducted a series of 
studies well-summarized by Zosh and Feigenson (2015). When 13-month-old infants are shown 
attractive objects that are then hidden in a box, they search for the objects, up to a point.  They 
will often search for up to three identical objects.  If four such objects are hidden, however, the 
process breaks down and infants act as if they have forgotten that multiple objects are hidden. 
This catastrophic forgetting does not take place, though, if the objects are different from one 
another. In that case, the infants typically search for up to three of the four items and then stop.  
Apparently, simply suggesting a developmental increase in the number of items in working 
memory is not going to be sufficient to explain the transition from infancy to adulthood.  
At this point, however, we must think carefully about exactly what infants are doing in the 
procedure of Zosh and Feigenson (2015), when they remove 3 of 4 items hidden in a box and 
then stop. A default hypothesis might be that they hold 3 items in working memory and pull out 
items from the box until they find all of the ones included in working memory; but that 
hypothesis cannot explain the findings. On most trials in which it is assumed that 3 items are in 
working memory, the first 3 items removed from the box will not be the same 3 as are held in 
memory, so the fourth item should be pulled from the box.  In fact, the obtained results are more 
like what would be expected if infants held only 2 items in memory and compared these items to 
the ones drawn from the box.  Suppose, for example, that Objects A and B happen to have been 
stored in memory, whereas Objects C and D have been lost from memory.  All four objects are 
Working Memory Maturation, Page 19 
 
entered into the box. When they are drawn out in random order, there are 24 equiprobable orders 
in which 4 items could be drawn.  The objects in working memory are drawn out within the first 
2 draws in 4 of those orders (ABCD, ABDC, BADC, and BADC) and the recovery of objects will 
be discontinued after the first 2 draws.  The objects in working memory will be drawn out in 
exactly 3 draws in 8 of those orders (ACBD, ADBC, BCAD, BDAC, CABD, CBAD, DABC, and 
DBAC) and the process will be discontinued after the first 3 draws.  Finally, in the remaining 12 
orders, all 4 draws will be needed in order for the infant to retrieve the specific 2 items in 
working memory; either Object A or Object B is drawn fourth.  Summing across all instances, 
the expected mean number of draws would be (2x4+3x8+4x12)/24 or 3.33 draws. We can 
conclude that either the infants in fact retained an average of slightly under 2 items in working 
memory, or else a different process was used by the infants to determine when to stop 
withdrawing objects from the box. We will discuss one possible alternative process in the 
following section of the article, related to Figure 2. 
Note that there may be some difficulty in reconciling infant and child results 
experimentally.  It is possible to use infant procedures with children, but superior performance in 
children compared to infants might not be theoretically decisive.  For example, a 10-year-old 
might succeed at the task of Zosh and Feigenson (2015) with four hidden items or more by 
counting items as they disappear into the box (e.g., Gelman & Meck, 1983), and might succeed 
at the procedure of Oakes et al. with five array items by systematically examining one item or 
more until a change is detected. This superior performance in children compared to infants still 
might not be taken as evidence of a larger basic capacity in children, but rather the development 
of secondary skills such as counting.  It may be that toddler research is especially needed to 
bridge most meaningfully the infant and child results on basic working memory capacity (e.g., 
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Keen, 2003; Simmering, 2012) because they do not yet have advanced strategies like counting 
that are not considered in the test rationale.  In any case, the hypothesis that the number of items 
in working memory simply increases with age remains viable, but has not been proven. 
Hypothesis of Control:  Automatic and Deliberate Maintenance in Working Memory 
According to another hypothesis, the proposed difference between infant and adult 
procedures is not in how many items can co-exist in the core part of working memory, but in 
how appropriately the contents can be controlled (cf. Kane & Engle, 2003), and thus the correct 
memoranda maintained, as the stimuli change across the experimental trial.  Theoretically, this 
might occur because of how two different kinds of working memory described by Cowan (1988, 
1999, 2005) are used, namely the activated subset of long-term memory, and the focus of 
attention (Figure 3). According to this embedded process model, incoming stimuli from the 
environment automatically activate physically-based features (tone pitch and loudness, 
brightness and line orientation, color, taste, touch, etc.) and sometimes activate some semantic, 
abstract features as well (phonemic categories distinguishing one word from another, word 
meanings, object identities, connotations, etc.). These activated features are subject to decay over 
time (Ricker & Cowan, 2014; Darwin, Turvey, & Crowder, 1972; Sperling, 1960; Treisman, 
1964) and subject to interference from subsequent input with similar features (Nairne, 1990).  In 
contrast, the focus of attention is limited to at most a few objects at once, producing integrated 
ensembles of features for those objects (cf. Kibbe, in press) and allowing a more complete 
semantic analysis of the objects or events. Features of items in the focus of attention remain 
activated temporarily after these items are no longer in focus. When I talk of working-memory 
capacity limits, I am referring specifically to how many items can occupy the focus of attention.   
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Presumably, deliberate actions that include head-turning or eye movements as well as 
manual movements and speech all emanate from the focus of attention.  There are, however, two 
ways in which information can get into the focus of attention and can result in actions.  In the 
first, the automatic route to action, incoming stimulation is seen to be discrepant from the neural 
model of prior stimulation, and it attracts attention. This can occur for stimuli for which there 
was no prior attention.  For example, a thunderclap can draw attention away from some ongoing 
attended activity.  It can also happen in a more extensive way for attended stimuli.  For example, 
if a stranger seen by a young child is a man wearing a kilt and the child has never seen anything 
like that before, the novel combination of man-with-skirt may attract attention.   
Second, in the deliberate route to action, attention is governed by central executive 
processes.  In verbal individuals, we sometimes can be sure that central executive processes are 
involved because responses can be altered according to instructions; but it is assumed here that 
manual responses in preverbal infants also can be deliberate and based on central executive 
processes.  It is also possible for the deliberate route to override the automatic route to control 
head and eye movements, even in infants (e.g., Johnson, 1995).   
The route that is used to make a response sometimes is critical for understanding responses 
in working memory tasks (and other tasks as well).  It can be important when the automatic and 
deliberate routes bear information that is discrepant, with the automatic route provoking a wrong 
answer unless the deliberate route overrides it.  One important example is the presence of 
proactive interference.  There are cases in which a certain feature is absent from a set of items 
studied on the current trial, but present in a recent, previous trial. According to the automatic 
route, there may be a feeling of familiarity worth attending to, but the deliberate route is able to 
use information indicating that this familiarity (from a previous, recent trial) is not the kind of 
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signal one wants to act on in the trial. Sometimes the automatic route leads to a prepotent 
response that one wishes to avoid (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003).  As I will discuss, the infant 
procedures may not elicit the deliberate route to the same degree as the adult procedures.   
Background:  controlled information maintenance in adults.  Consider a typical trial in 
the often-used, array comparison procedure (Luck & Vogel, 1997).  In one version of the 
procedure, the probe array is a repetition of a briefly-studied array of colored squares except that 
one item is marked (e.g., with a surrounding circle), and that item may have changed to a 
different color.  The task is to indicate whether the marked item has changed color. If so, it can 
cause a discrepancy from the neural model of the environment, attracting attention. However, for 
several reasons, that attention signal is not a reliable indicator that the item has in fact changed.  
To some extent, recognition of an item that was in the memory set also attracts attention, just not 
as much as a novel item. Moreover, the attraction of attention to a changed probe item might 
well be diminished if the neural model of the world is not limited to the present trial.  Suppose, 
for example, that green was a color present in the studied array on Trial n-1 but not on Trial n, 
and that the marked item in the probe array on Trial n is green.  If green is already in the current 
neural model from the prior trial, the marked item may not evoke a sense of novelty and the 
automatic system will not provide a helpful attention signal indicating that the marked item was 
not in the present, Trial n array.  This outcome would be an example of proactive interference, 
which has been documented in such array tasks (Shipstead & Engle, 2013).   
In the deliberate system, items are kept as much as possible continually in the focus of 
attention, or are drawn back into focus as often as possible, precisely to avoid such proactive 
interference.  For example, Cowan, Johnson, and Saults (2005) presented word lists followed by 
a probe word, the required response being to indicate whether the probe word was present in the 
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list. When the correct answer was “no,” the probe word sometimes matched (or resembled) a 
word presented in a recent trial.  With lists of 3 or 4 items, short enough to be held in the focus of 
attention, there was very little incorrect responding on the basis of the recent lure (i.e., very little 
proactive interference), but much more proactive interference was obtained with longer lists of 6 
or 8 items that presumably could not be held in focus.  
In the adult array change-detection procedure, if we assume that memory can be 
accumulated across more than one trial, there may be no reliable familiarity signal indicating that 
a change is present or absent. What the participant must then do is to keep the memory set in the 
focus of attention while comparing the relevant item to the marked probe. This procedure is 
illustrated in the top panel of Figure 4 for an unchanged probe and in the middle panel of that 
figure for a changed probe.  
Information maintenance in infant procedures.  According to this information-
maintenance hypothesis, infants of 8 or 9 months are already able to focus attention on 3 items 
and establish the corresponding activation of their features in memory.  However, infants and 
young children would not be able to use the deliberate system adequately to separate the stimulus 
stream into discrete events, only some of which should be used to motivate the response (e.g., the 
stimuli from the studied array on the present trial).  Unlike the adult procedures, the infant 
procedures may not require use of that deliberate system.   
Even in the “one-shot” procedure of Oakes et al. (2013), infants do not face one problem 
that the adults usually face in visual array memory procedures. In the infant procedure, a 
familiarity signal can indicate that one choice is more familiar than another, and thus more active 
in memory, even if the items are not in the focus of attention (Figure 4, bottom row).  In the adult 
procedure, this is not possible because only a single probe is presented; it will give rise to a 
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certain signal of familiarity, but there is nothing to compare it with. The result must be based on 
recollection of the probe as present or absent from the studied items on the present trial. 
In contrast to the usual adult procedure, but similar to Oakes et al. (2013), Cowan, Rouder, 
Blume, and Saults (2012) offered adults two response choices on every trial, one of which was 
taken from a studied list of words.  In this procedure, a familiarity signal should be useful as the 
studied word should be more familiar on average.  The findings in this study indicated that 
performance was better than one would expect on the basis of short-term capacity alone; a 
component of activated long-term memory had to be added to explain the results.  The array 
situation may be different, though, inasmuch as any capacity limit would strongly apply during 
encoding of the briefly-presented array; in list recall, memory is loaded more gradually. Thus, it 
could be an important comparison to try the Oakes et al. procedure on adults. 
The pattern observed by Zosh and Feigenson (2015), in the procedure in which objects are 
hidden in a box and can be retrieved by the infant, also can be understood in the embedded-
process view if the focus of attention can include 3 items in these infants. When a fourth 
identical item is presented, it replaces an item in the focus. Therefore, the infant may be happy 
with 3 items even though these may differ from the 3 items originally encoded into working 
memory.  That is, a direct comparison of items in working memory with items retrieved from the 
box is not carried out by the infants.  According to this suggestion it can be predicted that, if Item 
4 is then retrieved from the box by the experimenter, it should elicit less surprise than if an 
entirely new item were retrieved from the box.  That is the prediction because Item 4, while no 
longer present in the focus of attention, is often still present in the activated portion of long-term 
memory. The focus of attention is presumably limited to 3 items at once but, still, each item that 
emerges from the box can be compared to the potentially larger number of recently-presented 
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items in activated memory, and a mismatch caused by a novel object may recruit attention.  
Thus, the suggestion is to combine the object-retrieval procedure with an interest/looking phase 
on some trials, in future work.  
The top row of Figure 2 graphically illustrates why it is implausible to propose that the 
infant in the procedure of Zosh and Feigenson (2015) uses the focus of attention to compare the 
retrieved objects to the objects in memory.  In the example, an infant has retained three of four 
hidden objects in memory.  On 75% of the trials, by chance, the retrieved object will not match 
all of the objects in working memory, and it does not match in the example shown.  If there were 
a comparison process, the infant would still wonder what happened to one of the objects in 
working memory, Object B in the example.  The second row of the figure shows an alternative 
processing mode in which the retrieved object that was not in working memory now displaces 
one of the objects that was in working memory. When the infant has retrieved 3 objects, those 
objects will fill the focus of attention and the infant will be satisfied with the items reaped and 
will not notice the mismatch between the set stored originally in the focus of attention and the 
current set in focus. 
Childhood development of information maintenance. The developmental trend in 
working memory that we have seen during childhood could occur because young children are 
deficient compared to adults in the deliberate process of preserving items in the focus of 
attention while comparing them to the probe item. Such a process would be consistent with the 
report that a postcue can be used to draw array items back into the focus of attention less 
successfully in 7-year-olds than in older children or adults (Shimi, Nobre, Astle, & Scerif, 2014).  
The finding may also be compatible with the dynamic systems view of development, in which 
parameters of activation and inhibition mature to produce more stable representations in working 
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memory with age (Schutte & Spencer, 2009; Simmering & Patterson, 2012).  The notion would 
be that although 7-year-olds may hold in mind as many items as older children or adults, in the 
younger children the process of comparing an array to a probe would create interference that 
would tend to knock out of working memory some of the intended memoranda, resulting in 
poorer performance than in the older participants.  Similarly, in recalling a list, recall of some 
items would create output interference that could prevent the recall of additional list items, if 
attention-based processing was not sufficient to preserve the items not yet recalled.   
 What is the nature of controlled information maintenance?  It is not clear what 
processes are involved in the deliberate maintenance of information in the focus of attention but 
there is considerable work suggesting that in individuals older than about 6 years of age, the 
focus of attention rapidly circulates to refresh various items in turn.  The number of items that 
can be recalled is reduced in a linear fashion as a function of the cognitive load, the proportion of 
time during the input of the list taken up by an interleaved distracting task (Barrouillet, Portrat, & 
Camos, 2011).  This is presumed to occur because capacity is limited to the number of items that 
can be refreshed by attention before becoming inaccessible to the refreshing process because of 
rapid temporal decay of the memory representations.  Gaillard, Barrouillet, Jarrold, and Camos 
(2011) found that working memory performance differences between third- and sixth-grade 
children were eliminated when the amounts of time available for each part of the task were 
increased for younger children by an amount commensurate with their slower processing and 
refreshing times. This finding suggests that refreshing rate is a major basis of age differences in 
working memory, and it could be the basis of controlled memory maintenance.   
Camos and Barrouillet (2011) found, moreover, that at age 6 and below the cognitive load 
relation did not hold and, instead, information was lost as a function of time rather than cognitive 
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load, suggesting that children that young do not engage in the same maintenance process of 
refreshing the items in the focus of attention.  They instead let the information degrade over time.  
It is therefore possible that children younger than this maintain information only in the activated 
portion of long-term memory, with information shifting in and out of the focus of attention in an 
unprincipled way. Children older than 6 years would progress with age in the rate of systematic 
refreshing of information, and thus the amount that can be maintained in the face of interference.   
An alternative to the decay-based interpretation of refreshing is that there is a limited 
processing cycle time, within which all working memory items that are going to be retained must 
be activated in a serial manner (e.g., Lisman & Idiart, 1995). There is evidence that there indeed 
may be a processing cycle within which some kind of refreshing may operate (Fiebelkorn, 
Saalmann, & Kastner, 2013; Lisman & Jensen, 2013; Siegel, Warden, & Miller, 2009) but there 
is as yet little developmental evidence related to this alternative.  
Infancy to Childhood:  A Summary 
In sum, there are motivations for new research to determine whether the development that 
occurs during infancy and its transition to childhood involve increases in the number of items 
held in attention-based working memory, its scope; whether it is not the scope but attentional 
control that develops, allowing stable maintenance of the most relevant items in a wider range of 
circumstances; or whether both the scope and control of working memory develop.  Scope and 
control appear partly independent, as shown for example by Cowan, Fristoe et al. (2006).   
Development throughout the School Years:  Controlling Confounding Factors 
The interpretation of childhood developmental results depends critically on the infant 
research and its proper interpretation.  If the similarity in apparent working memory capacity of 
infants and adults is born out, then there is no room to anticipate developmental changes in 
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capacity during childhood.  Instead, the childhood development would have to be related to how 
children handle the additional demands that the adult-like procedures entail (presumably, control 
of working memory contents).  If infants actually are shown to retain fewer items or chunks than 
adults, then it becomes more likely that there is further, childhood development of capacity also. 
Although this fundamental question cannot yet be answered, we can ask about the task 
demands of adult-like procedures to determine what confounding factors other than capacity or 
control of the contents of working memory could account for the developmental improvement 
without reference to capacity. The capacity-growth theory benefits if we can experimentally 
control various mechanisms that change with development, and still find maturational growth in 
the number of items that can be retained in working memory.  This research strategy has been 
used by some who have concluded that mechanisms other than capacity do totally account for 
the improvements (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982, identification time; Dempster, 1978, 
chunking efficiency; Gaillard et al., 2011, attention-based refreshing rate), and others who have 
concluded that these confounding mechanisms do not have that impact (Burtis, 1982, chunking 
efficiency; Cowan, Elliott et al., 2006, speaking rate; Hulme & Muir, 1985, rehearsal rate). This 
strategy has not been used much lately but is the mainstay of my recent developmental research.  
Figure 5 shows measures drawn from several of my studies in such a way that a common 
comparison can be made across two age groups:  children 6-9 years old, and adults.  The top 
panel of the figure shows that, in all of the studies noted, there is evidence that adults yield 
estimates of the number of items stored in working memory that exceed the estimates for the 
children.  The bottom panel of the figure shows that, in each case, a measure of the efficiency 
with which working memory information is processed does not differ between the two age 
groups in the tasks used in these studies.  This increase in capacity (or perhaps mental attentional 
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energy:  Pascual-Leone, 1970) is as the neo-Piagetian approaches would suppose (e.g., Case, 
1995; Halford, Cowan, & Andrews, 2007; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2011). Below, details 
about each of these factors is explained. 
The Factor of Increasing Knowledge  
Evidence for the effect of increasing knowledge.  Knowledge can allow multiple 
stimulus items to be combined to form fewer meaningful chunks of information.  Chi (1978) 
showed that knowledge is critically important for working memory.  Children (third through 
eighth grade, mean age 10.5 years) who were expert at chess were better able to remember chess 
board configurations than were naive adults, even though the usual adult superiority emerged for 
memory of lists of digits. The case for knowledge was furthered by a seminal paper by Case et 
al. (1982).  They examined the ability to recall lists of ordinary, spoken, English words, and the 
speed of repetition of individual words within the set, finding both measures to be poorer in the 
children 3-6 years old than in young adults.  However, when adults received unfamiliar nonsense 
words instead of English words, their performance on both measures resembled the children with 
English word stimuli.  This finding suggested that the operational efficiency of working memory 
increases with familiarity with the materials, presumably accounting for the developmental 
increase in working memory performance.  
Cowan, Ricker, Clark, Hinrichs, and Glass (2015) argued, though, that the Case et al. 
(1982) results cannot necessarily be attributed to knowledge as an alternative to capacity 
development, but possibly knowledge in combination with capacity development.  That could be 
the case, for example, if the nonwords presented to adults must be encoded as more than 1 chunk 
each.  For example, the nonword item meeth as a novel combination might often have to be 
remembered as two chunks, perhaps “mee+th” or “m+eeth.” If so, adults studied by Case et al. 
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could have been superior to the children in the number of perceived chunks held in working 
memory, even if the two groups were in effect equated in the number of experimentally-defined 
items in working memory.  
Working memory development in childhood with knowledge controlled.  To examine 
the role of memory with knowledge controlled, Gilchrist, Cowan, and Naveh-Benjamin (2009) 
used verbal sentence materials. Children in Grades 1 and 6 (who are 7-8 and 12-13 years old, 
respectively) and adults were tested with spoken sentences that were easy for all age groups in 
the study to understand, e.g., Thieves took the painting; our neighbor sells vegetables.  These 
sentences were then combined to form lists of sentences that did not tell any coherent story. The 
task was to repeat the list of sentences verbatim.  It was supposed that each sentence would 
typically be represented as a single chunk, but that the sentence-long chunks would be retained 
separately in working memory.  There were two key measures.  First, a processing efficiency 
measure was chunk integrity, defined as the number of words recalled from a sentence, 
conditional on at least one content word being recalled from that sentence. That measure showed 
about .80 chunk integrity in each age group, so the developmental improvement in memory 
could not be explained by a change across age groups in chunk integrity. Second, there was a 
measure of chunk access, the number of sentences for which at least one content word was 
recalled.  Given that the integrity of each sentence as a chunk was high, it appeared that this 
measure of chunk access could estimate how many sentences (i.e., chunks) could be recalled 
mostly intact. This measure showed a developmental change (e.g., in a condition with 8 
unrelated sentences per trial, an increase from about 2.5 chunks in first-grade children to about 
3.5 chunks in adults).  The apparent developmental increase in capacity in this procedure, despite 
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the developmental constancy of sentence knowledge for these materials, is illustrated in the 
leftmost clusters of bars in Figure 5 (capacity, top panel; processing efficiency, bottom panel).     
Cowan, Ricker et al. (2015) set out to determine whether knowledge is sufficient to explain 
developmental changes in visual memory, using a modification of an array memory procedure 
developed with adult participants by Luck and Vogel (1997). The stimuli to be remembered on 
each trial of Cowan, Ricker et al. were briefly-presented arrays of either five English letters, or 
three unfamiliar characters (shown in Figure 6).  Given the superiority of the recall of letters, the 
difference in array size allowed the two stimulus sets to produce more similar levels of 
performance.  The participants were children in Grades 1-2 (6-8 years old), Grades 3-4 (8-10 
years), Grades 5-7 (10-13 years), and college students.  On each trial, the array to be remembered 
was followed 1 s later by a masking pattern, a retention interval of 1, 5, or 10 s, and then a probe 
item in the same spatial location that one of the array items had occupied, to be judged the same 
as the array item in the corresponding location or not found in the array.  
Results of this study were scored in terms of a formula to estimate the number of items in 
working memory, taking into account guessing (Cowan, 2001).  The formula was based on the 
assumption that an individual has k items in working memory on each trial and, if the array item 
at the probed location is in working memory, the individual knows whether the probe differs 
from the corresponding array item.  If the item is not known, the participant must guess.  The 
resulting formula is k=S(h-f), where S is the number of array items, h is the proportion of change 
trials in which there was a hit or correct detection of the change, and f is the proportion of no-
change trials in which there was a false alarm. If the development of working memory were 
totally the result of knowledge, there should be little or no developmental improvement for 
unfamiliar characters in Cowan, Ricker et al. (2015), for which none of the groups had prior 
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knowledge.  Clearly, that was not the outcome.  The initial result was that performance improved 
across age groups for both types of materials.  It was true that performance was higher for 
English letters than for unfamiliar characters and climbed more quickly across age groups; 
knowledge contributed to performance profoundly.  Moreover, there was an interaction between 
the materials and the age group.  The basis of the interaction appeared to be that some of the 
children in the youngest age group did not know their letters well; they revealed a capacity of 
less than 1 English letter and did not show much of an advantage for English letters over 
unfamiliar characters.  With those children omitted, the interaction between materials and age 
group was eliminated.  Cowan, Ricker et al. then examined the normalized results, which 
revealed the improvement from one year to the next in standard deviation units for each type of 
stimulus material. The developmental progression was quite similar and statistically 
indistinguishable for the two types of materials (Figure 7). Thus, provided that participants in all 
groups have sufficient basic knowledge of English letters, knowledge cannot explain the 
developmental increase in performance (see also the second column of panels in Figure 5).  The 
study also showed comparable loss in each group as the retention interval increased to 10 s.  In 
sum, though there is an obvious increases in knowledge across the elementary school years and 
beyond, the results show that it cannot be the sole basis of working memory development. 
The Factor of Attentional Filtering 
Evidence for the relation of attentional filtering at encoding to working memory.  A 
visual array recognition procedure has been used to show the potential relation between selective 
filtering and working memory in young adults.  Specifically, Vogel, McCollough, and 
Machizawa (2005) found that the event-related potential signature of a memory load showed a 
different pattern in participants with low versus high working memory performance.  High-span 
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adults showed similar patterns of brain activity for sets of 2 relevant targets (e.g., the orientations 
of green bars) no matter whether these were presented alone or along with 2 irrelevant items 
(e.g., the orientations of red bars).  In contrast, low-span adults apparently did not filter out the 
irrelevant items when the arrays were presented and showed a pattern of brain activity that was 
similar for, on one hand, 2 relevant items presented along with 2 irrelevant items and, on the 
other hand, 4 relevant items presented alone.  This suggested that in lower-span individuals, all 
items were allowed into working memory, imposing a task of filtering at the time of recall.  In 
the terms of Braver (2012), the high spans had a proactive performance strategy, filtering out the 
irrelevant items at the time of encoding; whereas the low spans had a reactive performance 
strategy, filtering out the irrelevant items only when that was unavoidable, at the time of test.  
Yet, it is not clear how general the finding is, of filtering at the time of stimulus 
presentation as the basis of working memory differences.  The procedure of Vogel et al. (2005) is 
complex because the electrophysiological measure of working memory load requires that 
participants attend to only one of two visual fields, so that performance depends on selectivity in 
some way on every trial, and not just on trials with differently-colored distractors.    
Providing a simpler index of filtering and working memory capacity, Gold et al. (2006) 
used a behavioral procedure in which participants received arrays with multiple types of objects 
(e.g., red and green bars).  The task in this example was to remember the orientations of the bars 
(horizontal or vertical), but they were of unequal importance.  A participant could be tested on 
the red bars on 75% of the trials and on the green bars on 25% of the trials.  Given the difference 
in priority, the smart allocation of attention would favor the more-often-tested (in this example, 
red) bars.  A measure of capacity was the estimate of the number of red and green bars in 
working memory, but a measure of strategic allocation of attention (i.e., processing efficiency) 
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was the extent of a difference in performance favoring the more-often-tested bars.  Surprisingly, 
schizophrenic participants were as good as control participants at allocating attention, but 
nevertheless remembered far fewer bars overall. Mall, Morey, Wolf, and Lehnert (2014) set up a 
situation in normal young adults in which participants could entirely ignore one type of object; 
eye movements were recorded as a measure of the degree to which individuals looked at the 
irrelevant items.  In agreement with the notion seen in Gold et al., that filtering does not in fact 
underlie individual differences, individuals with relatively poor working memory did not look at 
irrelevant items any more than other individuals (but see Fukuda & Vogel, 2011 for caution).   
Childhood development of working memory with selective filtering controlled.  It is 
clear that many functions of selective attention improve throughout childhood (Rueda, 2013), 
although it is not always clear if the observed improvements are entirely maturational and causal 
or if some of them can be viewed as consequences of other developmental changes (Ristic & 
Enns, 2015). In any case, in several recent studies we have investigated the role of attentional 
filtering on working memory development in childhood, as an extension of the method that Gold 
et al. (2006) used in adults.  The results suggest that the maturation of filtering abilities cannot 
explain working memory capacity development in the elementary school years (Cowan, 
AuBuchon, Gilchrist, Ricker, & Saults, 2011; Cowan, Morey, AuBuchon, Zwilling, & Gilchrist, 
2010).  Cowan et al. (2010) presented arrays with two differently-colored circles and two 
differently-colored triangles or, on other trials, with three of each shape.  (In other trial blocks, 
various numbers of objects in only one shape were presented.)  The array was followed by a 
probe item to be judged same or different compared to the corresponding array item. The task 
was placed in the context of a cover story in which each colored shape represented a child in a 
classroom (the array); the response was to indicate by mouse click where, in the classroom, the 
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probe “child” belonged or, if the “child” did not belong anywhere in the “classroom,” to click the 
door icon to send the “child” to the principal.  These responses yielded a rich set of conditions 
depending on the type of probe, but the responses were also later combined to form hits (correct 
indications that something changed between the probe and the array item) and false alarms 
(incorrect indications that something changed), allowing an application of Cowan’s (2001) k 
formula for items in working memory. 
The attention conditions of Cowan et al. (2010) varied by trial block.  In different blocks, 
participants received one shape only, were tested on the colors of one shape on 100% of the 
trials, were tested on one shape 80% of the time and the other shape 20% of the time, or were 
tested on each of the two shapes 50% of the time.  It was found that the number of items of a 
shape included in working memory varied systematically with the attention condition:  the more 
likely it was that a shape would be tested, the more attention was allocated to it.  For arrays with 
only two items in the tested shape, this allocation of attention was just as good for children in the 
youngest age group (6-8 years, Grades 1 & 2) as it was for older children and adults.  This can be 
seen in the third cluster of bars in the bottom panel of Figure 5. Yet, children in the youngest age 
group remembered far fewer array objects than did the older age groups (Figure 5, top panel, 
third cluster of bars).  This finding points to something other than filtering out of less-relevant 
stimuli as the basis of developmental change in working memory capacity.  The pattern of results 
in the 80% vs. 20% condition was replicated by Cowan, AuBuchon et al. (2011) using a slow, 
serial presentation of array items, with each colored shape appearing at a unique location and 
disappearing before the next item was presented 1 s later (Figure 5, fourth bar cluster).  
There was evidence in Cowan et al. (2010), however, that the strategic filtering broke 
down when the number of array objects was increased to three circles and three triangles.  In that 
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situation, children in the youngest age group showed similarly poor performance for all of the 
split-attention conditions (80%, 50%, 20%), suggesting that they were no longer able to allocate 
attention to such a fine degree when the task of encoding items into working memory was 
difficult. Thus, processing and storage shared a resource but processing efficiency was the result 
of a working memory difference between age groups, not the direct cause of one (for a related 
finding in adult individual differences, cf. Cusack, Lehmann, Veldsman, & Mitchell, 2009).  
The Factor of Encoding and Consolidation of Items in Working Memory 
Evidence regarding encoding and consolidation of working memory.  Some work, 
going back at least to Sperling (1960) and Phillips (1974), has focused on the transfer of 
information from visual sensory memory into a capacity-limited type of memory.  It has been 
observed that when a visual array is followed shortly afterward by a masking pattern, the process 
of entering items into working memory is disrupted. Entering items into working memory 
requires about 50 ms/item before a mask (Vogel et al., 2006; Woodman & Vogel, 2005). Further 
work showed the importance of free attention even after a mask, because higher-level 
consolidation continued (Jolicoeur & Dell’Aqua, 1998; Ricker & Cowan, 2014). Encoding or 
consolidation of information into working memory could speed up with development, resulting 
in more represented information. It would be reasonable to worry that the finding of Cowan et al. 
(2010) could be the result of poorer encoding or consolidation in young children for brief arrays. 
Child developmental evidence on working memory development with encoding and 
consolidation controlled.  Cowan, AuBuchon et al. (2011) addressed this issue of the potential 
developmental change in the process of encoding items rapidly into working memory by 
repeating the 80% vs. 20% condition of Cowan et al. (2010), but with a serial, slow, 1 item/s rate 
of presentation of the colored objects, with two objects of the more-often-tested and two of the 
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less-often-tested shape. It does not appear that the speed of encoding or consolidation can 
explain the age difference in the number of items stored in working memory in this procedure; 
the pattern of results was unchanged by the slow, serial presentation. Of course, with other kinds 
of stimuli for which there is a large age difference in long-term memory content, a major 
determinant of working memory performance might well be encoding speed or efficiency.   
The Factor of Verbal Rehearsal  
Evidence on the role of rehearsal.  It has been clear for many years that, as children grow 
older, beyond about 6 years, they acquire the ability to remember lists better by repeating the 
items or their names, either overtly or covertly when overt repetition is not practical (Flavell, 
Beach, & Chinsky, 1966; Ornstein, Naus, & Liberty, 1975; Tam, Jarrold, Baddeley, & Sabatos-
DeVito, 2010).  This seems like a potent, important contribution to working memory 
development.  The issue addressed here, however, is whether rehearsal can account for 
development of what otherwise might appear to be an increase in basic storage capacity.  
There is evidence that rehearsal may play a role in development.  Cowan, Cartwright, 
Winterowd, and Sherk (1987) tested adults on spoken word span with a secondary, articulatory 
suppression task preventing rehearsal during the list presentation (repeatedly whispering one 
word during auditory list presentation) and found that span under these conditions resembled 5-
year-old children without suppression, with reduced effects of phonological similarity between 
items.  Note, though, that age differences in the phonological similarity and word length effects 
can be caused by psychometric scaling issues; when young children attain a lower level of 
performance on lists of short, phonologically dissimilar items, there is less room for further 
decreases to result from less favorable stimulus qualities, such as phonological similarity among 
the list items (Jarrold & Citroën, 2012; Jarrold & Hall, 2013). Cowan, Saults, and Morey (2006) 
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found effects of suppression less vulnerable to the psychometric concerns because a complex 
pattern of results differed between 9-10-year old children versus adults. Suppression in the adults 
made the pattern change strikingly to match the children’s pattern, but the adults’ results 
nevertheless occurred at a somewhat higher performance level.  
Even for nonverbal materials, it seems clear that the pattern of responding changes as 
rehearsal develops.  For example, Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal, and Heffernan (1991) showed that 
memory for line drawings of common objects changed as a verbal code came into play.  Children 
who were 11 years old performed worse if the names of the pictured objects were long to 
pronounce or if they were phonologically similar to one another, making accurate rehearsal 
difficult.  Children who were 5 years old showed the same pattern only when the task required 
that the picture names be pronounced or when the experimenter pronounced the names. This 
finding does not seem vulnerable to the aforementioned psychometric concerns because Hitch et 
al. adjusted their list lengths to equate performance levels among groups.  In sum, then, rehearsal 
appears to play an important role in the development of working memory.   
Often, the materials that have been used to examine visual working memory seem 
available for verbal rehearsal.  Theoretically, for example, adults might transform an array of 
colored squares into their color names, albeit with some use of spatial memory to preserve the 
location of each color.  In practice, however, given the short presentation time of each stimulus 
array, it appears that rehearsal does not play much of a role in such circumstances.  Morey and 
Cowan (2004) showed this by administering an array memory task with several different 
secondary tasks during the retention interval between the array of colored squares and the test 
probe.  Recitation of the participant’s own 7-digit telephone number during the retention interval 
had no effect on performance, whereas recitation from memory of a just-seen random 7-digit 
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number did interfere with memory for the visual array.  This was taken as evidence that the array 
is not transformed to a verbal form for retention, but that both the visual array and a random 7-
digit number require a common pool of attention for their retention (for related evidence of a 
common attentional resource for verbal and visual processing, see Vergauwe et al., 2009).   
Evidence on the development of capacity with rehearsal controlled.  Cowan, 
AuBuchon et al. (2011) carried out several conditions of their visual array task in which the 
stimuli to be remembered were series of colored shapes. In one condition, the participant was to 
name the color of each object as it was presented. In another, the participant was to remain silent 
and, in an articulatory suppression condition, the participant was to say “wait” after each object.  
In each age group, suppression conferred a disadvantage relative to the other two conditions, 
which did not differ much.  The pattern of development was essentially the same in each 
condition:  there was no age difference in the allocation of attention that favored the 80%-tested 
shape over the 20%-tested shape, but there was a large developmental increase in the number of 
items in working memory. The fifth cluster of bars in the bottom panel of Figure 5 shows that the 
inefficiency in performing the task caused by articulatory suppression did not differ between the 
groups, probably because covert rehearsal is not an important way to retain these particular 
stimuli. Thus, it does not appear that the contribution of verbal rehearsal can fully explain the 
increase in working memory capacity with age in childhood.  
The Factor of the Reinstatement of Context 
Adult evidence on effects of context.  In the studies illustrated in Figure 5, like many 
other studies, the test probe included only a single item, which was either identical to the array 
item that was in the same location or changed from it.  One way in which this test probe 
theoretically might be processed is for the participant to imagine the entire array and to use that 
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imagined array as a cue to the memory of the item in the location of the probe. Numerous adult 
studies have shown that there is some memory for the configuration or structure across items, in 
addition to memory of individual items (e.g., Brady & Tenenbaum, 2013; Jiang, Olsun, & Chun, 
2000; Woodman, Vecera, & Luck, 2003; Xu & Chun, 2007). The tendency to organize random 
arrangements, which has resulted in the naming the constellations of stars as dippers, scorpions, 
etc., could contribute to good adult performance on array memory.  Perhaps young children’s 
working memory suffers from the poverty of configurational information in memory.    
Child developmental evidence with context controlled.  The developmental increase in 
visual working memory performance might occur because young children perceive the array as a 
collection of isolated objects, whereas adults perceive the array as a configuration. To examine 
this possibility, Cowan, Saults, and Clark (2015) presented arrays of colored objects (circles, 
tested on 80% of the trials, and triangles, tested on the remaining 20%).  What distinguished this 
study from previous ones in this developmental series is that the probe was not always just a 
single colored object as in Cowan et al. (2010); in other trial blocks, the colored probe object was 
accompanied by markers for the locations of the remaining objects from the original array.  
These markers were unfilled, uncolored line drawings of the shapes that had occurred in the 
corresponding positions in the studied array. We hypothesized that this arrangement of stimuli in 
the probe display could provide a spatial-layout context that would allow first- and second-
graders to catch up with older children and adults by helping them to remember the array 
configuration.  We presented the contextual items as line drawings to avoid interference from the 
non-tested colors, a type of interference seen previously in adults (Wheeler & Treisman, 2002).   
The finding was that the contextual cues were helpful to young children, but only in 
limited circumstances.  When the critical probe item remained the same or changed to a color 
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that was not in the studied array, the contextual cues were of no help to any age group.  In other 
trials, however, the probe was an object that had appeared elsewhere in the studied array (i.e., the 
probe was the same color and shape as an object that had appeared at a different array location).  
The correct answer was to indicate where the probed object belonged in the studied array.  In this 
situation, children in the first four grades of elementary school benefitted from the contextual 
cues, whereas older children and adults did not. Apparently, older participants have a more 
precise representation of the spatial layout of the studied array, and this extra context helps them 
locate items in the array and makes the contextual markers unnecessary to identify a probe 
object’s location in the array (cf. Burnett Heyes et al., 2012). In sum, although spatial 
configuration does improve with development, there is an important component of visual 
working memory development that cannot be attributed to configuration.  
Development during the School Years:  Summary 
The outcomes of the tests for confounding factors, none of which is sufficient to account 
for working memory development, are summarized in Table 1. It is not easy to get rid of the age 
difference in working memory performance during the elementary school years.  The control of 
many possible confounding factors, one at a time, did not eliminate the age effect in memory.   
Concluding Remarks 
In sympathy with the neo-Piagetians, I believe that working memory development is a key 
aspects of cognitive growth from infancy to adulthood. Infants have the working memory 
necessary to begin to represent concepts, and then slowly gain the ability for these concepts to 
have more parts, or to have themselves represented along with the concepts, or to represent the 
context for appropriate use of the concepts (Halford et al., 2007).  Within that general view, 
however, there is room for subtly different mechanisms. It could be the number of attention-
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related slots in working memory that increases with age (the number of separate chunks that can 
be maintained at once:  Cowan, Elliott et al., 2005); or what increases with age may be attention-
control-related factors that allow the slots to be filled most usefully (Kane & Engle, 2003).   
 To put a practical face on this theoretical distinction, consider a young child who is 
learning to go trick-or-treating on Halloween. The child does not automatically say the requisite 
utterances, “trick or treat,” “thank you,” and “goodbye.” These parts are gradually learned 
(Berko Gleason & Weintraub, 1976).  According to a capacity theory, a young child fails to 
complete the ritual for a reason that may be similar to why the lengths of utterances in early 
language are short:  because there are not enough slots in working memory to allow more parts 
of a concept to be represented at once or knitted together. According to the attention control 
theory, on the other hand, the child may start off with every intent to say the three magic words 
of the ritual; but when the door opens and the child is confronted with a stranger offering candy, 
attention shifts and does not prevent the new features of the experience from replacing some of 
the magic words in working memory. Anecdotally conforming to the latter notion, last year I had 
the experience of opening the door to find that a young, masked child forgot to let go of the 
doorknob, following it rather automatically into a house in which he did not know the residents.   
In hopes of inspiring future work to compare the capacity-growth versus the growth-of-
control hypotheses, an important message of this review is that there is an intrinsic 
interconnectedness of working memory research on humans at various developmental levels. 
There is a great need for increased communication between infant and child researchers. If 
infants and adults can be said to have equivalent chunk capacities, as a first look at the infant 
literature might suggest, then it seems likely that the childhood trends have to do with some other 
factor; I have suggested in particular the ability to maintain the appropriate items in the attention-
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based part of working memory, a process that is more demanding in adult-like procedures than in 
infant procedures. By this hypothesis, young children’s memory should be captured by 
inappropriate stimuli during the retention or test intervals more easily than older children or 
adults. If, however, infants and adults do differ in true capacity, then what has been observed in 
children may well include a genuine increase in capacity with age in childhood. This is still a 
distinct possibility, consistent with one interpretation of the infant literature discussed above.   
Regarding the interconnectedness of infant- and child-based research conclusions, it is 
encouraging when researchers discuss the need to bridge infant and childhood studies, Infants 
cannot carry out the adult-like procedure, and older children (e.g., perhaps above 5 years) cannot 
perform the infant procedures without importing a host of strategies unavailable to the infants. 
Therefore, it may be particularly useful to adapt the infant measures for use with very young 
children (Keen, 2003) or to find simplifications of the adult procedures that can document a 
developmental increase in working memory in very early childhood, starting as young as 3 years 
(cf. Simmering, 2012).  
A problem with the capacity-growth hypothesis is that it comes across as a glorified null 
hypothesis. Thus, if confounding factors are controlled and the age difference in working 
memory still does not disappear, as my colleagues and I have found repeatedly, then one is 
tempted to conclude by default that there is a genuine age difference in capacity. In the future, 
this inferential method could be augmented, inasmuch as there are separate positive markers in 
studies of functional magnetic resonance imaging for the control of attention, dependent on 
frontal lobe areas (for a review see Kane & Engle, 2002), and the indexing of items in working 
memory for attended items regardless of the modality of those items, more dependent on parietal 
lobe areas and the intraparietal sulcus specifically (Cowan, Li et al.. 2011; Todd & Marois, 2004; 
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Majerus et al., 2014; Xu & Chun, 2006). There is evidence for the representation of the activated 
portion of long-term memory in association areas, with special functional connectivity between 
those areas, when they are task-relevant (i.e., comprise activated long-term memory), and the 
intraparietal sulcus (Emrich, Riggall, LaRocque, & Postle, 2013; Lewis-Peacock, Drysdale, 
Oberauer, & Postle, 2012; Li, Christ, & Cowan, 2014).  There are also related markers of the use 
of attention to refresh information in working memory (Raye, Johnson, Mitchell, Greene, & 
Johnson, 2007).  There is a considerable literature on the neurological development of the 
frontal-parietal network (e.g., Casey, Giedd, & Thomas, 2000; Clasen, Toga, Rapoport, & 
Thompson, 2004; Gogtay et al., 2004; Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002; Scherf, 
Sweeney, & Luna, 2006; Sowell et al., 2003; Thomason et al., 2009) and when researchers are 
drawn to these more analytic issues of the mapping of different processes onto the developing 
brain, the capacity-growth hypothesis can cease to be seen as only a null hypothesis. 
It remains to be determined just how the growth of working memory would be combined 
with developing knowledge and skills to determine a child’s growing potential for 
comprehension and problem-solving. There has been some disappointment in attempts to 
improve children’s abilities through working memory training (e.g., Melby-Lervåg, & Hulme, 
2013) and this might be expected until we know more about what the mechanisms of working 
memory development are and what role attention plays.       
If we come to understand what principles of working memory help to govern cognitive 
growth, we may take an important, albeit primitive step toward better educational practices and 
remediation of cognitive disorders, by learning more about how much information is or is not 
likely to take hold in a particular child’s mind in particular circumstances.   
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Table 1 
Factors other than working memory capacity that could account for the childhood development 
of working memory, studies that have examined these factors, methods used in these studies, and 
main findings 
 
Factor Study Method Conclusion 
1. Could more 
knowledge result in 
larger chunks and 
could these chunks 
explain the growth of 
visual array memory 
capacity? 
Cowan, Ricker, 
Clark, Hinrichs, & 
Glass (2015) 
Recognition of items 
from visual arrays of 
English letters or of 
unfamiliar characters.  
Elementary school 




some of the first-grade 
children who did not 
know letters well, 
normalized growth in 
recognition was similar 
for English letters and 
unfamiliar characters. 
2. Could more 
knowledge result in 
larger chunks and 
could these chunks 
explain the growth of 





Verbatim recall of lists 
of simple, unrelated 
spoken sentences.  
Access to sentences 
measures capacity; 
completion of accessed 
sentences shows 
chunking. Ages 7, 12, 
and college students. 
Knowledge hypothesis 
disconfirmed.  Even 
though at all ages, ~80% 
of words from accessed 
sentences were recalled 
(good sentence 
knowledge), the number 
of sentences at least 
partly recalled grew 
developmentally.  
3. With development, 
could the better ability 
to filter out irrelevant 
information allow 
more working 




Zwilling, &  
Gilchrist (2010) 
Recognition of items 
from mixed arrays. In 
the critical condition, 
80% of trials the color of 
a circle is probed; 20% 
of trials, the color of a 
triangle is probed.  
Children 7-8, 12-13, 
college students. 
Filtering hypothesis 
disconfirmed.  With only 
4 items in an array (2 
circles, 2 triangles), 
participants of all age 
groups filtered out less-
relevant shapes equally.  
Yet, the younger 
children remembered far 
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Table 1, cont’d 
 
4. Could the 
developing ability 
rapidly to encode 





& Saults (2011) 
Method as in #3 (Cowan 
et al., 2010) except that 
items were presented one 
at a time at a slow, serial, 
1 per second rate. 
Children 7-8, 12-13, and 
college students. 
Encoding hypothesis 
disconfirmed.  Results 
were the same as in #3 
even though the potential 
encoding difficulty was 
removed. 
5. Could the 
developing ability to 
rehearse nonverbal 
stimuli verbally allow 
better recognition? 
Same study as 
immediately 
above, #4 (Cowan, 
AuBuchon et al., 
2011) 
Method as explained just 
above but with the need 
to say “wait” after each 
item to interrupt 
rehearsal 
Rehearsal hypothesis 
disconfirmed.  There 
was still a developmental 
difference in the number 
of items recognized. 
6. Could the ability to 
reinstate the context of 
a recognition cue 
improve with age? 
Cowan, Saults, & 
Clark (2015) 
Arrays of colored 
squares were followed 
by a probe square for 
recognition, which was 
sometimes surrounded 
by markers of where the 
other squares had been. 
Children 7-8, 9-10, 12-
13, and college. 
Context hypothesis 
disconfirmed.  Younger 
children benefited from 
the contextual markers, 
but only for trials in 
which the precision of 








Figure 1.  Estimated items of various types recalled by children as a function of age, based on a 
rescoring of the results from Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing (2004, Table 1).  
Based on the number of trials per length that they used and their scoring system, each mean from 
the table was divided by 6 except for visual pattern memory scores, which were divided by 3.  
The steeper development of visual patterns and mazes compared to other modalities could be 
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Figure 2.  Illustration of hypothetical processing modes in the hidden-objects infant procedure of 
Zosh and Feigenson (2015) with three items in working memory.  Each row progresses from left 
to right.  Four objects schematically labeled A-D are hidden in a box, and three of them have 
been retrieved by the illustrated point in time. In the top row, the infant compares all of the 
retrieved objects to the objects in the attention-based part of working memory.  This method, 
however, would leave the infant unsatisfied after three withdrawals on 75% of the trials because 
not all three of the remembered objects would be withdrawn in the first three draws.  In the trial 
shown, for example, Objects A, C, and D have been retrieved but D was not in working memory 
so the child presumably would keep looking for the fourth object in working memory, B.  The 
bottom row reflects the proposed alternative strategy with no comparison process; Object D 
replaces Object B in the attention-based part of working memory, so B is forgotten and the infant 
is satisfied with three objects. This process more closely matches the obtained results unless the 
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Figure 3.  Schematic view of the embedded-processes theoretical framework of Cowan (1988, 
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Figure 4.  Illustration of proposed processing modes in change-detection procedures with a 
capacity of three working memory items.  Each row progresses from left to right.  The top row 
shows adult-like processing when four items, schematically labeled A-D here, are presented; 
three of them are encoded in the participant’s attention-based part of working memory; and one 
of the items that is probed happens to be present in this part of working memory.  The probe is 
explicitly compared to the corresponding array item.  The middle row shows adult-like 
performance in the same sequence, but with a changed probe; the probe is judged different from 
the corresponding array item in working memory.  The bottom row shows a strategy that can be 
used in the one-shot infant procedure of Oakes, Baumgartner, Barrett, Messenger, and Luck 
(2013).  Because two probes are presented and one comes from the array, the two probes can 
often be distinguished on the basis of relative activation based on novelty. The bold shape 








































Figure 5.  Data from 4 experiments illustrating age differences in the estimated number of items 
in working memory (top panel) despite no difference in the relevant measure of processing 
efficiency (bottom panel).  Experiments listed on the x axis:  1=Gilchrist et al. (2009); 2= 
Cowan, Ricker et al. (2015, 1-s delay); 3=Cowan et al. (2010); and 4=Cowan, AuBuchon et al. 
(2011).  The top panel reflects memory for (1) at least one content word from each short, spoken 
sentence to indicate access to that sentence within 4-sentence lists; (2) letters from a spatial 
array; and (3-4) colored objects from a spatial array. The atypically high capacity of adults in 
Experiment 2 is likely to reflect the covert verbal rehearsal of letters.  In the bottom panel, the 
measures of processing efficiency are (1) the proportion of words recalled from accessed 
sentences, i.e. from those sentences with at least one content word recalled; (2) memory for 
letters divided by the sum of memory for letters and unfamiliar characters; (3, 4a) memory for 
the colors of the more-relevant shape divided by memory of the colors of both shapes together, 
based on 4-item arrays, silent condition; and (4b) memory for colors from trials with silence 
divided by memory for colors from both silent and speak-an-irrelevant-word conditions summed.  
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Figure 6.  Stimuli in an unfamiliar-character trial of an experiment on the role of knowledge in 
visual working memory development.  Reproduced from Cowan et al. (2015, Developmental 
Science, Figure 1).   
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Figure 7.  Standardized scores for capacity in the unfamiliar-character and English-letter 
conditions of an experiment on the role of knowledge in visual working memory development, at 
a 1-s retention interval.  In terms of these scores, the two types of materials show 
indistinguishable rates of improvement across age groups.  Reproduced from Cowan et al. (2015, 
Developmental Science, Figure 4).  Most children in Grades 1-2 are 6-8 years old. 
 
  
 
 
 
